NON-PUBLIC?: N
ACCESSION #: 9507170042
LICENSEE EVENT REPORT (LER)

FACILITY NAME: Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1 PAGE: 1 OF 3

DOCKET NUMBER: 05000348

TITLE: Reactor Trip Due To Spurious Closure of Main Steam Line Isolation Valve
EVENT DATE: 06/11/95 LER #: 95-005-00 REPORT DATE: 07/11/95

OTHER FACILITIES INVOLVED: DOCKET NO: 05000

OPERATING MODE: 1 POWER LEVEL: 100

THIS REPORT IS SUBMITTED PURSUANT TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF 10 CFR SECTION:
50.73(a)(2)(iv)

LICENSEE CONTACT FOR THIS LER:
NAME: R.D. Hill, General Manager - Nuclear Plant TELEPHONE: (334) 899-5156

COMPONENT FAILURE DESCRIPTION:
CAUSE: SYSTEM: COMPONENT: MANUFACTURER:
REPORTABLE NPRDS:

SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT EXPECTED: NO

ABSTRACT:

At 2139, on June 11, 1995 with Unit 1 in mode 1 operating at 100 percent power, the reactor tripped due to a turbine trip in response to a spurious main steam line isolation valve (MSIV)SB! closure. The main steam line isolation valve closure was attributed to water intrusion into a junction box located in the 1B motor driven auxiliary feedpump room. The water intrusion resulted in a short circuit across normally open relay contacts causing closure of the main steam line isolation valve. The water intrusion was a result of a room cooler which leaked water in the area of the junction box. Water accumulated on the electrical conduit entering the junction box and seeped into the junction box through a conduit connection. An inspection of the O-ring seal associated with the conduit connection indicated that the O-ring appeared to have been damaged during original installation. Similar Unit 1 junction boxes associated with the remaining MSIV's were inspected.

Additional Unit 1 junction boxes which may be potentially susceptible to water intrusion were inspected. Some evidence of previous moisture accumulation was noted. Identified discrepancies have been resolved. Unit 1 was cooled down to mode 5 for an inspection of the MSIV and no damage was evident. The MSIV actuator assembly did not reveal any discrepancies that would have contributed to a spurious closure. In addition, selected portions of the main steam piping and hangers were inspected and no damage was evident.

The unit was returned to power operation at 2315 on June 17, 1995.

END OF ABSTRACT

Plant and System Identification

Westinghouse -- Pressurized Water Reactor
Energy Industry Identification System codes are identified in the text as XX!.

Description of Event

At 2139, on June 11, 1995 with Unit 1 in mode 1 operating at 100 percent power, the reactor tripped due to a turbine trip in response to a spurious main steam line isolation valve (MSIV)SB! closure. The main steam line isolation valve closure was attributed to water intrusion into a junction box located in the 1B motor driven auxiliary feedpump room. The water intrusion resulted in a short circuit across normally open relay contacts causing closure of the main steam line isolation valve.

Cause of Event

The water intrusion was a result of a room cooler which leaked water in the area of the junction box. Water accumulated on the electrical conduit entering the junction box and seeped into the junction box through a conduit connection. An inspection of the O-ring seal associated with the conduit connection indicated that the O-ring appeared to have been damaged during original installation.

Safety Assessment

All safety systems operated as designed.

This event would not have been more severe if it had occurred under

different operating conditions.

Corrective Action

The room cooler leak was repaired and similar room coolers on Unit I and 2 were inspected for leaks.

Similar Unit 1 junction boxes associated with the remaining MSIV's were inspected. Additional Unit 1 junction boxes which may be potentially susceptible to water intrusion were inspected. Some evidence of previous moisture accumulation was noted.

Identified discrepancies have been resolved and applicable junction boxes resealed.

Unit 1 was cooled down to mode 5 for inspection of the MSIV and no damage was evident.

The MSIV actuator assembly was inspected and did not reveal any discrepancies that would have contributed to a spurious closure.

Selected portions of the main steam piping and hangers were inspected and no damage was evident.

Additional Information

No similar LERs have been reported by Farley Nuclear Plant.

Research revealed that the affected junction box was properly classified as a non-environmentally qualified component.

A review is in progress involving an evaluation of applicable Unit 2 junction boxes which will require an inspection.

A four hour non-emergency notification was made pursuant to 10CFR50.72.

The unit returned to power operation at 2315 on June 17, 1995.

Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Post Office Box 1295
Birmingham, Alabama 35201
Telephone (205) 868-5131

Dave Morey Southern Nuclear Operating Company
Vice President
Farley Project the southern electric system

July 11, 1995

Docket No. 50-348 10CFR50.73

U. S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
ATTN.: Document Control Desk
Washington, D.C. 20555

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant - Unit 1
Licensee Event Report 95-005-00
Reactor Trip Due to Spurious Closure of Main Steam Isolation Valve

Ladies and Gentlemen:

Joseph M. Farley Nuclear Plant Licensee Event Report 95-005-00 is being submitted in accordance with 10CFR50.73. If you have any questions, please advise.

Respectfully submitted,

Dave Morey

REM/maf:MSIVLER.DOC

Attachment

cc: Mr. S. D. Ebneter
Mr. B. L. Siegel
Mr. T. M. Ross

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